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THE PROPOSED U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR 
EUROPE AND THE OLD CONTINENT'S 
REACTION 
Aleksandra Lencznarowicz 
DRAWING AN IMAGE OF THE IDEA 
The United States and European Union enjoy a complex and complicated 
relationship, its dynamics so aptly expressed in Kagan's words: "Americans are from Mars and 
Europeans from Venus." 1 Despite sometimes tumultuous transatlantic relations, the United 
States is steadfastly conmlltted to maintaining peace and stability on European continent. 
This paper addresses the question why the proposed deployment of the U.S. nllssile defense 
shield in Europe was met with nllxed reactions, and argues that it represents the deeper 
divisions within European Union, underscoring the different relationships between the 
United States and the Old Europe, as opposed to the new E.U. members. 
The security aspect of the transatlantic alliance is perhaps the most important one, and 
the case of the nllssile defense constitutes a test for how the partners on both continents are 
able to cope with their differences, and whether they are able to COlne to a constructive 
agreement without fracturing the Atlantic community. Moreover, the issue offers an 
excellent opportunity to gain the insight into motivations and methods of nations that, 
while divided by their historical experiences and current interests, are struggling to chart a 
conunon policy. The process of forging a unified course presents an opportunity for other 
nations to observe and draw the lessons for their own endeavors. 
Drawing upon the current exchange of ideas on the subject, the paper evaluates one 
of the more controversial U.S. defense initiatives since WWII, as an integral part of the 
American security strategy. Moreover, it exanlines the United States' rational and the 
particulars of the proposed nllssile defense system and further, attempts to present the 
Europe's division on the issue. Employing the relevant statistical data, as well as the opinion 
polls and surveys, the research shows the perceptions of the societies and governments 
involved. The project strives to combine and present the views expressed in the literature on 
the nlissile defense from both sides of the Atlantic. As majority of the works on the subject 
examine the actions of main actors, this paper delves into their motivations. The goal of the 
research is not to advocate for anyone side of this issue, but rather to expose the roots of 
Europe's diverse reaction, and present its implications for the transatlantic relations. 
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DELVING INTO THE MISSILE DEFENSE CONCEPT 
The American Perspective 
In order to properly analyze the United States' proposed missile defense initiative, it 
has to be viewed in the context of its general conmutment to the security of Europe. Partly 
from conml0n cultural bonds, partly from political consideration and extensive trade, the 
U.S. entered two World Wars to re turn Europe to peace. The shear importance of the 
continent becam e a spark for the Cold War with the Soviet Union, where the United States 
found itself firmly conmutted to European allies, the position subsequently formalized by 
signing the NATO agreement.2 The obligations U.S. took upon itself to protect free Europe 
and prevent future conflicts between European nations, has led Am.erican strategists to the 
logical conclusion that the ballistic nussiles pose a serious threat, wluch the United States 
and Europe ought to be able to repe!.3 
What is a missile defense shield? In the broadest terms, it is a defensive system charged 
with intercepting inconling enemy nussiles. The origins of the current nussile defense may 
be found in, albeit much more ambitious, plans to deploy Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
in the 1980s.4 Much of the research and development that went into it, was used to create 
the current scaled down version of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).5 The 
United States argues that the nussile defense is necessary, since the proliferation of the 
ballistic nussiles makes the threat ever more real. M oreover, these weapons are found in the 
hands of multiple states and perhaps organizations, making them more difficult to deter. To 
illustrate the spread of these weapons one may consider the statistical data published by the 
Department of Defense that shows that in 1972 only nine states possessed ballistic nussiles, 
in 1990, as the Cold War was drawing to a close, the number went up to 16, and by the end 
of 2006, the number increased to 25 states.6 
The United States views the missile defense as a necessary component for its own and 
Europe's security. T his is dictated not only by ballistic nussile proliferation, but also by the 
international security environment, that is more complex and less predictable than bipolar 
world of the ColdWar.7While these weapons could not destroy Europe (unless armed with 
nuclear warheads) by posing a constant psychological threat they could become a source of 
intinudation aimed at population centers of the continent. The United States is not alone 
in identifYing the wide spread of ballistic nussiles as a clear danger to its security. 
Underscoring the international consensus regarding the nussile threat, NATO Secretary 
General ]aap de H oop Scheffer stated after the N orth Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, 
"There is absolutely a shared threat perception. Allies all agree a threat from ballistic nussiles 
exists."8 
While these weapons may have multitude of sources, of particular concern are the 
ballistic nussile development and testing programs underway in North Korea and Iran, and 
their related proliferation activities, with Iran being the potential direct threat to Europe.9 
As far as North Korea is concerned, the threat it poses to Europe is an indirect one, through 
proliferation of the nuclear and nussile technology to countries such as Iran. Moreover, what 
makes N orth Korea such a danger is the personality of its leader Kim ]ong-il and his 
unpredictability. to Iran, on the other hand, has a system of government, in which decision 
making process is divided between religious leadership and civilian officials, making its 
motivation difficult to decipher for the West. Furthermore, Iran has been receiving a great 
deal of technical assistance from countries such as Russia and China, as well as before 
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mentioned North Korea that shared its No Dong missile technology, and helped in 
development of Iran's newest Shahab-3 rocket.!! This weapon, while still in the 
development, would have a 2000 km range and could reach m.ost of the European cities.!2 
One view is that Iran's sponsoring of Hezbollah and Hanus might lead to sharing its missile 
technology with its surrogates, a potentially destabilizing development, and one that would 
not be deterred by a simple surety of retaliation.!3 
While the threat coming from Teheran is being used recently to explain the urgency 
for implementation of the system, from us. perspective the missile shield would provide an 
enhanced deterrence and freedom from intimidation for years to come, regardless of who 
the potential enemy might be.!4 There is also an added benefit affecting directly US. 
security, the proposed defensive shield over Europe would offer an improved capability to 
defend the United States against potential ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. It 
would also offer additional capability to deal with the threat, beside an offensive retaliation 
or military preemption. Moreover, the shield would undermine military usefulness of such 
missiles, and may dissuade potentially hostile states from indigenous development, or foreign 
acquisition of these weapons in the first place.1S If this result is achieved, it would satisfY 
directly the United States and European nonproliferation goals. 
The Particulars of the System 
The proposed ballistic missile shield would be an integrated system with BMDS 
currently deployed to protect North America. As such, it would utilize command and 
control, as well as early detection sensors and other assets already in existence. The two 
additional installations necessary for an implementation of the defense shield over Europe 
are: the X-band midcourse radar that is proposed to be located in the Czech Republic, and 
tl~e interceptor site destined to be situated in Poland. The installation in the Czech Republic 
would provide vital data to the overall functioning of the system. The information obtained 
will be used to identify and distinguish the missile warhead from other missile parts (such 
as separated booster rockets) and potential countermeasures (decoys etc.), but most 
importantly, it will be used to guide interceptors to the projected traj ectory of the ballistic 
missile warhead. 16 The site proposed to be located in Poland would consist of ten 
interceptors, similar to the ones currently deployed in Alaska and California; however, they 
would be a two staged variant that is quicker, lighter, and better suited for the engagement 
ranges and timelines in Europe. 17 These ground-based interceptors are designed for 
defensive purposes only and employ small exoatmospheric hit-to-kill vehicles (EKV) .1 8 Any 
modifications to this platform to transform it into an offensive weapon would require the 
extensive, lengthy, and costly changes that would be clearly visible to any observer. The 
above mentioned assets could also become the core of the envisioned by NATO Active 
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, to ensure coverage for all 
European nations requiring such protection. 19 
Possible Scenario 
The typical envisioned scenario for the missile defense in Europe would perhaps play 
itself in this fashion: a thermo bloom is detected by the US. satellite asset signaling to the 
command and control center a missile launch, its size and heat signature, verifYing that it is 
an Iranian Shahab-3 rocket, being launched from the area known to be a terrorist 
stronghold. In the first few seconds of the flight it is determined that it is a three stage, solid 
propellant variant and that its initial projected course will take it to the center of Vienna, 
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Austria. The conU11and and control support composed of a network of computers and 
communications equipment, part of the larger U.S. command and control system (BMDS), 
transmits and receives data on this threatening missile launch. T he flight profIle and 
projected target enable military leaders to determine the optimum time and place to launch 
the kill vehicles. T he system is designed to rapidly provide a wide range of information to 
decision makers, because of the short distances in Euro pe and the great speed of ballistic 
missiles that require threat assessment and interceptor launch decisions in just minutes. T he 
political leadership makes a snap decision to intercept. T he midcourse radar site in the 
Czech R epublic, already alerted and tracking the target, goes from standby to active 
acquisition of an inbound and relays relevant data to the Polish interceptor site, which 
launches at an optimum m om ent. In the n1eantime conulland and control center notifIes all 
the interested parties, including Russian military cOlIDlland that an intercept is currently 
taking place. As the EKV closes on the Iranian missile and subsequently destroys it, 
everybody takes a sigh of relief. While tlus scenario has not yet taken place, it serves as an 
illustration of how vital this installation can be. C urrently, without the shield in place and 
operatio nal, the only option the leadership could weigh is the retaliatory attack on the 
source. If the point of the launch was located in the midst of the urban area, it is doubtful 
such decision would be made, not to mention the relative value of destroying the city for 
the act of the few. 
Old Continent's Position 
What has been Old Contin~nt 's reaction to the American proposal? T he concept of 
U.S. installations sparked a heated debate in Europe. This controversy brought to light h ow 
fi ckle the consensus within the continent is on security and defense issues, as well as 
underscored the difference in relationships between Old and N ew Europe with the United 
States. T here seemed to be three m aj or points of contention with the American plan. 
First , some European countries argue that the proposed system implemented through 
bilateral agreem ents between United States, Poland and the Czech Republic has no 
provisio ns for encompassing NATO structures , and that the core principal of the collective 
defense may be undermined. T hey would like to see the m atter of nussile defense discussed 
as a NATO issue. The policy of the United States in this respect is seen as the continuation 
of the unilateral stands U.S. has been pursuing following the attacks of 9/ 11 .Americans seem 
to be interested more in the results than in the process, the latter being central to European 
sensibilities. The United States appears to be taking an easy road that offers best chances for 
the success of its policies, without stepping into quagnure of the negotiations with Old 
Continents' many nations with so diverse interests, while Europe sees the overt lack of 
consultations on matters di rectly affecting Europe's security as insulting.20 The proponents 
of the American initiative note that to bring the matter to the forum where agreement by 
all is necessary, the successful passage of the concept is unlikely in the extrem e, since various 
European states attach a very different importance to the threat posed by the ballistic 
nussiles.21 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the nussile defense is not something Europe 
is prepared, nor has technical capability to provide for itself. 
Second concern refers to an alleged threat conung from Iran . Even the supporters of 
the deployment of the shield agree for the most part, that Teheran does not pose a clear and 
present danger to their co untries at tlus time. Further, European influence in the Middle 
East might actually dinunish if Europe is perceived to be pursuing American strategy. 
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Moreover, some argue that faced with nuclear tipped Iranian missiles aimed at Paris or 
Berlin, Europe could hardly be unfazed, depending on reliability of the missile defense 
shield, the technology that can not be 100% accurate all of the time. 22 This is contradicted 
by the argument that this system can not be justified or denied existence based solely on 
current threats, since it takes years to build and it will continue to serve well into the future 
against all enemies. 
The third point of the disagreement, and the source of a major European opposition, 
is the stance of Russia. As former Russian President Putin rattled his sabers complaining 
about the West's incursion into his sphere of influence, and threatening to abrogate the treaty 
on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), which bans nuclear tipped medium ranged 
missile systeuls, some European countries, most notably Gennany, seems to acquiesce.23 
Noteworthy is the objection voiced by the neorealist scholar Waltz, who believes that such 
systems are inherently destabilizing, further perpetuating undesirable unipolar World order, 
and capable of igniting aggressive arms races, since the best perceived way to overcome 
missile defense, is to saturate it with greater amount of warheads. 24 The United States rejects 
the Moscow's rhetoric, responding that it is an undeniable fact that proposed missile defense 
would not affect the Russian nuclear deterrence. The ICBMs are far beyond the capability 
of the system to intercept, and moreover, most of them would not even overfly Europe on 
the way to North America . Regardless of these facts, Russia used the proposed shield to 
explain away recent increases in the defense spending, as well as possible cancellation of the 
INF treaty. The hawks are pointing out however, that the efforts to halt the erosion of the 
Russian sphere of influence are precisely the reasons why continuing and direct U.S. 
engagement in Europe is so necessary. It is also extremely insulting to the sovereign nations, 
such as Poland or Czech Republic, to be still considered belonging to that sphere.25 
From the Vantage Point of the Old Europe 
The American proposal is generally viewed with the high degree of skepticism by the 
continental Europe. This reflects not only the objections to the merit of the installation, but 
perhaps more so, to the unilateral way the United States seem to be pursuing its objectives. 
As the national goals for the major European players vary, so do the reasons for resisting the 
U.S. plans. Historically countries such as France led more independent security policy and 
were reluctant to accept U.S. initiatives, striving not to become dependent on America for 
their defense. As an example may serve France's exiting from the military NATO structures 
in 1966.26 Therefore France strongly opposed the concept of the American missile shield.27 
Germany, which during the heat of this controversy held the presidency of the E.U. and 
tried to find the balance for the countries on both sides of the issue, generally opposed the 
concept of the missile defense, based on the premise that it may spark a new arms race with 
Russia, as well as unnecessarily antagonize this major supplier of energy to the European 
Union. 28 Indeed Germany's recent policy towards Russia that reflects its bilateral energy 
deals, can be viewed as extremely accommodating to the point of the appeasement. United 
Kingdom, certainly a member of the Old Europe, and the traditional ally of the United 
States, has been often conducting a policy that was not always in line with the rest of 
Europe, being more receptive to the American arguments, and even favored the deployment 
of the system within its borders.29 
Through the Eyes of the New Europe 
On the other side of the issue stood New Europe, represented by Poland and the 
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Czech Republic, who actively lobbied to have the missile defense sites located on their 
territories. This area coincided with, what was determined by the United States to be the 
perfect geographical location for the installations. However, to gain a clearer understanding 
of the motivations for the New Europe's position on this issue, it is necessary to consider its 
historical experiences that had a direct bearing on its perceptions of potential threats and 
their origins. The failure of the Western European allies to come to their effective aid at the 
inception ofWWII as promised in the treaties, and subsequent abandonment of the region 
to the Soviet sphere of influence, are still vivid in the memories of Poles and Czechs. This 
area was also invaded and/ or occupied by Russia; in case of the Czech Republic during the 
latter part of the :xx century, while Poland suffered territorial occupation, as well as 
systemic political anu cultural exploitation dating back to the XVIII century, casting the 
shadow on the future relations between Moscow and the Central European nations.30 
Despite decreasing popular support for some American policies, a majority of Polish 
and Czechs citizens consider continuing United States' engagement in Europe as vital to the 
region's security, perceiving America as the only country that can ultimately guarantee their 
safety.31 While missile defense shield would ostensibly protect Europe from the threat of 
Iranian missiles, both Poles and Czechs understand and appreciate its long term stabilizing 
effects, through added security against all enemies and potential threats. The statistical data 
indicates that neither Poles, nor Czechs see Iran as an inu1linent threat, rather it is broadly 
understood security of their country, and Europe respectively, that is at the heart of their 
decision to support the system.32 Russia's aggressive rhetoric in the opposition to the 
deployment of the missile shield adds significantly to the support of the American initiative. 
The sentiment of the Central European nations is well represented in the quote of the 
former deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Alexander Vondra, who stated that: 
"For us in the Czech Republic with our location between Germany and Russia , to have an 
installation with a few American soldiers is a good thing."33 While both governments of 
Poland and the Czech Republic generally support US. installations, the popular sentiment 
is mixed and demographically diversified. The most noticeable divergence between the two 
countries is the apparent fracture between governments' positions and popular support. The 
Czech govermnent steadfastly promotes the American installation within the Republic, 
while the population's position is a bit lTlOre cautious. In Poland this trend is reversed, with 
the population leading the pro arguments .34 
European Union's Position 
The European Union is in the process of combining members' views on foreign and 
security policies to present a unified front through its Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP).35 This second pillar of the European Union is far from completion and the general 
position of the E.U. on the issue of security, was summarized in the statement of Javier 
Solana, the Secretary-General of the Council, in his speech to the European Parliament in 
the spring of 2007: "On security matters, the treaties in force allocate sovereignty to EU 
member states, but that sovereignty must be compatible with the union's general interest in 
security."36 TIllS statement emphasizes the fact that the European Union does not have a 
cohesive security policy at this time, and these decisions default to the national 
goverm1lents. However, the restrictions on these individual policies placed by the European 
Union so as not to compromise the good of the whole, may be seen as the initial steps of 
the E.U closer cooperation in the matters of security. Subsequently, during US.-E.U 
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Slll11l1Ut, at the end of April 2007, The United States and Europe have agreed in principal 
on usefulness of such a system; however, many differences remain to be reconciled. The new 
European Union reform treaty leaves ultimately such issues up to the individual member 
states.37 
Europe's Dynamic Position 
Europe's position on the matter of placing nussile shield by the US. within the E.U 
is a dynanucally evolving situation that is being affected by the democratic processes within 
all interested parties. As an example, the 2007 November elections in Poland resulted in the 
formation of the new government that favors closer consultations with the E.U. to seek 
broader consensus before proceeding with the project. Behind Warsaw's hesitation m.ay lay 
the perceived weakness of the American adnunistration during its last few months in 
power.38 At the same time, the pendulum of support swung in the other direction in 
countries such as France, where President Sarkozy seems to lead considerably less adversarial 
policy toward the United States and its plans in Europe, emphasizing the Iranian threat.39 
The degree and the source of support for the American plans are also shifting and evolving 
within the New Europe, where there seem to be the slight disconnect between the 
populations and their governments. In the United States the Congress, led now by the 
Democrat Party, has for a time withheld funding for the project, sending nuxed signals to 
the countries and governments that have invested their reputations and hopes in the 
implementation of the system4 0 The Uluted States, while undergoing its election cycle, is 
focused internally and the uncertainty of the presidential succession adds to the anxiety of 
it,S new European allies, 
Implications for Transatlantic Relations 
In conclusion, the support and the opposition to the proposed US defense initiative 
appears to follow the more pronounced fault lines between the Old and the New Europe, 
It represents the different geopolitical positions, historical experiences, common sentiments 
and myths of the populations expressed through the democratic process in the dYl1anLically 
changing positions of the respective governments, Whether the two parts of Europe are 
merging or drifting apart, and if the United States helps to unite, or separate the transatlantic 
conm1l1nity, will be essential to all concerned, As European Union's specialist Hix notes: 
"When the interest of the states diverge the EU becomes incapacitated and the member 
states pursue their interest independently of the EU"41 
The proposed US nussile defense shield for Europe pronLises to be able to bring 
multitude of benefits; however, it is burdened with serious objections, voiced on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The possibility of the renewed arms race with Russia, the erosion of the 
cohesiveness of NATO, and lack of the credible nLissile threat, are all serious concerns 
necessitating further debate and careful consideration before proceeding with the 
implementation of this strategy, Sununarizing the benefits of the initiative, the capability to 
extend defensive coverage to Europe against long-range ballistic nussiles, which would 
enhance the collective security of the NATO Alliance, strengthen transatlantic unity, 
reaffirm America's conmutments to European security, and avoid the decoupling of 
Washington and Brussels security interests, would be indeed a welcomed development, 
Moreover, the issue also represents a crucial element in the U,S,-E,U, relations, and if 
resolved to a mutual benefit, it may further cement the transatlantic bond, The question 
whether this initiative would fulfill US goals and become a successful strategy in defending 
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Europe remains to be answered, the future shape of the World may depend on it. 
APPENDIX 
Figure 1. Current Defensive Coverage Against Long Range Missiles 
.... ~ 
Figure 2. Defense Coverage Proposed by the United States 
Source: Missile Defense Agency, 07-MDA-2321 
http: // www.ndia.org/ Content/ ContentGroups/ Divisions1 / Missile _Defense/ 0 bering%20 
presentation%203-5-07.pdf (30 May 2008). 
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